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- BACKGROUND ON MY REPLY TO SAIG 7269.
- WORDED BY INDICATING THAT IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT HE HAD GIVEN GENERAL APPROVAL FOR A SUBSTANTIAL EXPANSION OF KUBARK ACTIVITIES IN VIETNAM IN CONNECTION WITH THE TOTAL COUNTER-INSURGENCY. GENERAL TAYLOR REPLIED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AS FOLLOWS; "REPLYING TO YOUR MEMORANDUM OF 1 JULY 1964, SUBJECT:

 ***REPLYING TO YOUR MEMORANDUM OF 1 JULY 1964, SUBJECT:

 ****MISAFPREHENSION THAT I TOOK ANY DECISIONS OR EXPRESSED ANY APPROVAL OF ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED AT THE BRIEFING. I AM INTERESTED IN ALL THE MATTERS MENTIONED IN YOUR MEMORANDUM BUT WOULD

RELES ING OFFICER.

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- ND DISCUSSED THEM WITH THE LOCAL OFFICIALS, PLEASE WITHHOLD ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL UNTIL I UNDERSTAND THE REQUIREMENTS
- 3. THIS WAS FOLLOWED UP BY TELEPHONE CALL THIS MORNING
 WHICH HE INFORMED ME THAT HE HAD THE IMPRESSION WE WERE
 ARRING AN END RUN. HE POINTED OUT THAT HE DOES NOT MAKE
 DECISIONS WHILE BEING BRIEFED. HE STATED THAT HE WAS INTERESTED
 WEVERYTHING WE HAD MENTIONED BUT THAT NOTHING WILL BE DONE
 WILL HE HAS STUDIED THE ENTIRE MATTER ON THE SCENE.
- 4. SHORTLY AFTER THE TELEPHONE CALL, I DISPATCHED THE DELOWING LETTER TO GENERAL TAYLOR: "FOLLOWING UP ON YOUR LETTER OF 1 JULY IN RESPONSE TO MY MEMORANDUM OF THE SAME AND YOUR PHONE CALL THIS MORNING, I WANT TO ASSURE YOU LAT THE ONLY ACTIONS WE HAVE TAKEN HAVE BEEN TO EXCHANGE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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PAGE 3

TEPLORATORY DISCUSSION WITH ALEXIS JOHNSON, WE HAVE ALERTED

ME OF OUR OLD SOUTH VIETNAMESE HANDS, BUT HAVE NOT MOVED

I'I AM SORRY IF WE GAVE YOU THE IMPRESSION OF MAKING AN TO RUN -- THIS WAS CERTAINLY NOT THE INTENTION SINCE IN WROTE YOU, AND ONLY TO YOU, AND YOU ARE THE COACH, THE CAPTAIN, AND THE QUARTERBACK OF THE TEAM.

"WE WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE SUGGESTIONS WHEREVER WE FEEL

"CAN BE HELPFUL. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THE ASSETS OF THE

A BENCY ARE AT YOUR DISPOSAL. YOU NEED ONLY TO TELL US HOW

"WOULD LIKE US TO HELP."

5. AS YOU CAN SEE FROM THE FOREGOING IT WAS MOST FORTUITOUS
YOU HAD PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH ALEXIS
WISON. THE LAST SENTENCE OF MY LETTER QUOTED ABOVE IS

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Lt. Cen. Marshall S. Carter Director

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HU/

2 July 1964

General Maxwell D. Taylor
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefe of Staff
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Taylor:

Following up on your letter of : July in response to my menorandum of the same date, and your phone call this morning. I want to assure you that the only actions we have taken have been to exchange views with Peer deSilva in Saigon who, in turn, has had an exploratory discussion with Alexis Johnson. We have alerted some of our old South Vietnamese hands, but have not moved any people at all.

I am sorry if we gave you the impression of making an end run--this was certainly not the intention since I wrote to you, and only to you, and you are the coach, the captain, and the quarterback of the team.

feel we can be helpful. I can assure you that the assets of the Agency are at your disposal. You need only to tell us how you would like us to help.

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Faithfully yours,

/s/

Marchall S. Carter

25X1 MSC (2 July 1964)
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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

1 July 1964

Dear Pat:

Replying to your memorandum of 1 July 1964, subject: "CIA Operations in Vietnam", I would like to correct any misapprehension that I took any decisions or expressed any approval of activities discussed at the briefing. I am interested in all the matters mentioned in your memorandum but would like to reserve judgment thereon until I have got on the ground and discussed them with the local officials.

Please withhold any additional personnel until I understand the requirements better.

Sincerely,

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Lieutenant General Marshal Carter Deputy Director Central Intelligence Agency

RELITE.

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General Maxwell D. Taylor THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



Lieutenant General Marshal Carter Deputy Director Central Intelligence Agency



1 July 1964

General Carter:

Colonel Rogers in General Taylor's office called and read the following memorandum dated 1 July 1964 to me over the phone. You will receive this memorandum today, and I read it to you over the phone last night.

"Dear Pat:

Replying to your memorandum of 1 July 1964, subject: CIA Operations in Vietnam, I would like to correct any misapprehension that I took any decisions or expressed any approval of activities discussed at the briefing. I am interested in all the matters mentioned in your memorandum but would like to reserve judgment thereon until I have got on the ground and discussed them with the local officials.

Please withhold any additional personnel until I understand the requirements better.

Sincerely,

/s/ Maxwell D. Taylor"

I was not able to reach Myers, Colby or Mr. Helms in their offices this evening, so they have not as yet been informed.

Lois

1 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Maxwell D. Taylor

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Pentagon

SUBJECT:

CIA Operations in Vietnam

1. In the course of your briefing on 27 June, I understand you gave general approval for a substantial expansion of CIA's activities in Vietnam in connection with counterinsurgency. Our present thinking is that this would involve a step-up of our efforts in intelligence and counterintelligence, political action and irregular paramilitary activities. Arrangements will be necessary to insure that this expansion is appropriately coordinated with the operations of MACV, USOM, USIS, ste., but that at the same time we retain the flexibility essential to successful CIA operations.

2. In the intelligence field, as was reported to you, there

have been continued good relationships between military and civilian intelligence activities. We believe that there is more that can be 25X1 done, especially in 25X1 military operations in the "hold" phase. In this area, we believe the lines of coordination and collaboration have been 25X1 established, and that it needs only firm direction and encouragement. 3. With respect to arrangements for 25X1 coordination and Ambassadorial control are also adequately established and I believe you will be fully satisfied as to your full know-

ledge and control of these operations.

4. In the paramilitary field, I believe there is an area of ambiguity as to just how irregular forces can best contribute and how they should be best related to the operations of ARVN, the Regional Forces and the Popular Forces. From DOD, there is a definite contribution to such irregulars which can be made and is highly necessary. Coordination between DOD and CIA has been satisfactorily arranged in the past with the U. S. Army Special Forces, and I am sure that some similar arrangement can be accomplished again. I suggest that the problem be examined and a program developed on the ground with the assistance of a representative of JCS/SACSA and Mr. William Colby of CIA. To these two, I would recommend the addition of General Victor Krulak, as I suggest that the Fleet Marine Forces Pacific may be able to provide the DOD input into such a combined operation in the manner this was done in the past by the U. S. Special Forces, thereby avoiding any interference with the U. S. Army Special Forces current missions and undue calls on their available resources.

25X1	5. In order to provide the fastest	t possible expansion of CIA's
25X1	operations in Vietnam, I am arranging	for the dispatch of
		d tours in Vietnam and who
25X1	officers will be understudied by addition	there in the past. These nal personnel experienced
	in such operations but who may be relat	tively new to Vietnam.

6. If this proposal meets with your general approval, I will have Mr. Colby contact JCS/SACSA and General Krulak to arrange for an early visit to Vietnam to help initiate the above developments. A telephone call to me will suffice.

Marshall S. Carter Lieutenant General, USA Acting Director

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Maxwell D. Taylor

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Pentagon

SUBJECT:

CIA Operations in Vietnam

- 1. In the course of our briefing on 27 June, you indicated general approval of a substantial expansion of CIA's activities in Vietnam in connection with counterinsurgency. Our present thinking is that this would involve a step-up of our efforts in intelligence and counterintelligence, political action and irregular paramilitary activities. Arrangements will be necessary to insure that this expansion is appropriately coordinated with the operations of MACV, USOM, USIS, etc., but that at the same time we retain the flexibility assential to successful CIA operations.
- 2. In the intelligence field, as we reported to you, there has been a growing improvement in relationships between military and civilian intelligence activities. We believe that there is more that can be done, especially in

military operations in the "hold" phase. In this area, we believe the lines of coordination and collaboration have been established, and that it needs only the firm direction and encouragement I know you will give it.

3. With respect to the arrangements for coordination and Ambassadorial control are also adequately established and I believe you will be fully satisfied as to your full knowledge and control of these operations.

- 4. In the paramilitary field, I believe there is an area of ambiguity as to just how irregular forces can best contribute and how they should be best related to the operations of ARVN, the Regional Forces and the Popular Forces. From DOD, there is a definite contribution to such irregulars which can be made and is highly necessary. Coordination between DOD and CIA has been satisfactorily arranged in the past with the U. S. Army Special Forces and I am sure that some similar arrangement can be accomplished again. I suggest that the problem be examined and a program developed on the ground by a representative of JCS/SACSA and Mr. William Colby of CIA. To these two, I would recommend the addition of General Victor Krulak, as I suggest that the Fleet Marine Forces Pacific may be able to provide the DOD input into such a combined operation in the manner this was done in the past by the U. S. Special Forces. thereby avoiding any interference with the U. S. Army Special Forces current missions and undue calls on their available resources.
- 5. In order to provide the fastest possible expansion of CIA's operations in Vietnam. I am arranging for the immediate dispatch of officers who served tours in Vietnam and who developed operations there in the past. These officers will be understudied by additional personnel experienced in such operations but who may be relatively new to Vietnam.

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X1

6. If this proposal meets with your general approval, I will have Mr. Colby contact JCS/SACSA and General Krulak to arrange for an early visit to Vietnam to initiate the above operations.

John A. McCone Director

26 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

Lhave just reviewed the proposed briefing for General Paylor with Bill Coloy and offer the following suggestions:

- i. Run-down on the current station activities be succinct and brief.
- In this connection I am committed to the President to put the best and most experienced CIA personnel in Saigon. I wish that you would search these out and move them from posts anywhere in the world to Saigon where they are needed. I do not think it wise to depend on "new Jaigon hands." It is better to reinforce the station with capable men with past SVN experience irrespective of personal hardships.

- 4. I want to demonstrate to Taylor a willingness to do anything and everything to put the show on the road and to give them support and I do not want to protect anyone, including General Taylor himself, from past errors.
- 5. Above all we must meet the Presidential directive of supplying the best and most capable men available and I am afraid the Division is not planning things that way.

I wish you would get into this matter personally and in depth prior to the briefing Saturday morning.

JOHN A. McCONE Director

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/0: General Carter

Attached draft prepared by Colky in response.

b DC/'s request for follow-up action after meting

with General Tay br.

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1. Peer de Silva, COS Saigon

Note: Dissemination added per Mr. Knoche.

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